Introduction
On December 10, 2025, the Government of Karnataka tabled the Karnataka Hate Speech and Hate Crimes (Prevention) Bill, 2025 (the “Bill“) to prevent dissemination and punish perpetrators of hate speech and hate crimes. The Bill has since been passed by the Karnataka Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council, now awaiting the assent of the Governor. This is a significant step because, if passed as a law, the Bill would form India’s most prominent state-level legislation formally regulating hate speech. Amplified by social media, the hate speech ecosystem in India fosters communal violence and hate crimes, necessitating legislative intervention. However, the provisions of the Bill include vague language and harsh penalties, which would consequently have an adverse effect on the constitutional safeguards protecting free speech. Accordingly, the Governor should delay its enactment until the lapses in drafting of the Bill are appropriately addressed.
Vague Definitions and Arbitrary Powers under the Bill
While the Bill’s intent is to curb acts of hate speech and minimize the role of hate speech in communal violence, the Bill is marred with vague language used in the definitional section. Under Section 2(1)(i) of the Bill, “hate speech” is defined to include any expression “with an intention to cause injury, disharmony or feelings of enmity or ill-will.” Moreover, under Section 2(1)(ii) of the Bill, “hate crime” means an act of propagating such hate speech “to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will”. The subjective nature of these definitions is apparent, as the Bill offers no elaboration on what constitutes “disharmony” or “ill-will.” The use of such broad language in the Bill consequently places extensive powers in the hands of the executive, that can in its own discretion determine which acts create “disharmony” or “ill-will”. The Bill does not clarify whether “disharmony” requires a threshold of communal violence to be created, or whether mere political disagreement could form the threshold. Without comprehensive elaboration on the scope of these terms under the Bill, its enactment risk inconsistent and potentially discriminatory enforcement. Additionally, what is most concerning is that the vague nature of the offences under the Bill is supplemented by harsh penalties for non-compliance or violation. Under Section 3, whoever commits a hate crime can be punished with imprisonment of up to seven years.
Additionally, under Section 4 of the Bill, police officers (of rank Deputy Superintendent or above) are authorized to take “necessary preventative action” if they have reasons to believe that a person is even likely of committing an offence. This provision operates even before any offence occurs, and with no elucidation on the scope of “necessary preventative action.” But not only is the Bill plagued with undefined scope, wide powers and inadequate drafting, its provisions are also liable to be struck down due to existing precedent under case law and potential constitutional violations.
Constitutional Vulnerabilities and Inconsistency with Judicial Precedent
The Bill’s vague language is liable to be struck down due to inconsistency with established case law and constitutional violations. In the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,[1] the Supreme Court while striking down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act“), held that “a penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal offence with sufficient definiteness.” It was further emphasized that both ordinary persons and administrators of the law must have a clear idea of what constitutes prohibited conduct under a criminal offence. Otherwise, such vagueness risks arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. In the context of this, the Bill fails to properly paint a picture of what constitutes prohibited conduct. Political discussions often touch upon topics that can cause discomfort among listeners and participants. Genuine political discussions can even incite feelings of anger amongst listeners. The Bill is not clear on whether this could amount to “disharmony” or “ill-will” under the Bill’s prohibited conduct.
Furthermore, the Bill inadvertently curbs citizens’ fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution of India (“COI“). Under Article 19(2), “reasonable restrictions” may be imposed on such freedom. However, such restrictions must be “couched in the narrowest possible terms.[2]” The subjective nature of the Bill’s offenses makes the restrictions imposed on freedom of speech in Karnataka broad and arbitrary, falling foul of Article 19(1)(a).
Disconnect from Central Legislation: Comparison with BNS
The Bill directly contrasts the center’s position on regulation of hate speech. Under the Bill, focus of the offense is commission of a hate crime, or the creation of “disharmony” or “ill-will.” This contrasts with the structure of criminal offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS“). Under the BNS, criminal liability is anchored to mens rea, the guilty intent of a criminal offender. For example, under Section 299 of the BNS penalizes “deliberate” and “malicious” acts intended to outrage religious feelings. In contrast, the Bill requires only the intent to cause injury, disharmony, feelings of enmity or ill-will. There is no requirement that the disharmony or ill-will herein is maliciously created. Additionally, the penalties of the Bill are much more severe when compared to the penalties under the BNS. Under Section 299, for “deliberate” and “malicious” acts outraging religious feelings, an offender is liable for imprisonment of up to three years. This is unlike the Bill, where the punishment can go up to seven years.
Conclusion
The Karnataka Hate Speech Bill addresses genuine communal threats but falters constitutionally and falls foul of Supreme Court precedent. Vague definitions and disproportionate penalties echo significant lapses in drafting, necessitating reconsideration. Despite the pressing need for regulation and curbing of hate speech and hate crimes, such legislative intervention must not be performed hastily. Curbing hate speech demands precision and constitutional compliance, as overbroad hate speech laws can breed selective enforcement, vitiating the very purpose of enacting such a Bill. Accordingly, the Governor, weighing assent, must prioritize constitutional fidelity over hasty legislation.
[1] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523.
[2] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523.
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