When the Internet Refuses to Move On: Media Reporting, Discharge and Dignity

In the case of IE Online Media Services Private Limited v. Nitin Bhatnagar and Ors.[1], the High Court of Delhi (“High Court“) upheld an interim injunction directing restraint on the continued circulation and indexing of news reports concerning an accused who had been discharged. This decision underscores the constitutional limits of post-discharge media reporting and affirms that the freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a) must, in appropriate cases, yield to an individual’s right to dignity, privacy, and the right to be forgotten under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Background of the Case

This case arose out of an appeal filed by IE Online Media Services Private Limited (“IE Online“) under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC“), challenging an interim order (“Impugned Order“) passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi (“Trial Court“). The Impugned Order had granted interim relief in favour of Nitin Bhatnagar (“Respondent“), restraining the continued publication, circulation, indexing, and referencing of certain news reports published by IE Online and certain other media houses.

The Respondent, a senior banking professional, had been arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement in August 2023 in connection with proceedings arising out of alleged irregularities relating to Moser Baer India Limited. Pursuant to the arrest, several news reports were published associating the Respondent with the alleged offence. Subsequently, however, the Respondent was discharged by the jurisdictional court on August 17, 2024, with the court finding no legally admissible evidence against the Respondent. Ultimately, the criminal complaint itself was dismissed on July 24, 2025. Despite this, the news reports continued to remain accessible on digital platforms.

Aggrieved by the continued online availability of these reports, the Respondent instituted a civil suit, seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions for de-indexing and de-referencing of the impugned articles, inter alia, on the ground that their continued circulation violated his right to privacy, dignity, and the right to be forgotten under Article 21 of the Constitution of India (“Constitution“). The Trial Court, taking note of the Respondent’s discharge and the potential for irreparable reputational harm, granted interim relief restraining further circulation.

Challenging this order, IE Online contended before the High Court that the reporting constituted fair and accurate reportage and was thereby protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Further, IE Online argued that the interim injunction amounted to an impermissible prior restraint on press freedom.

Freedom of the Press versus the Right to Dignity

The High Court reaffirmed the settled position that although the freedom of the press is a constitutionally protected facet of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is not an unfettered right. Relying on the Supreme Court of India’s (“Supreme Court“) decision in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India[2], the High Court reiterated that the right to privacy under Article 21 encompasses the preservation of an individual’s dignity, reputation, and informational self-determination, particularly in the context of digital dissemination of personal data. The High Court also placed reliance on the Kerala High Court’s decision in Dejo Kappan v. Deccan Herald[3], which recognised that continued publication of criminal allegations against a person who has been acquitted or discharged, may, over time, lose its legitimate public interest and instead operate as a source of unwarranted reputational harm.

While reporting on arrests and investigations may be justified at the contemporaneous stage when such events occur, the evaluation shifts once the criminal proceedings conclude in favour of the individual concerned. The internet’s capacity to preserve and amplify information indefinitely distinguishes digital reporting from traditional print media. The continued online availability and algorithmic resurfacing of content associating an individual with criminal allegations, despite their exoneration has the effect of perpetuating stigma, undermining rehabilitation, and inflicting disproportionate harm on the individual’s dignity and social standing.

Pertinently, the High Court clarified that the issue was not the truthfulness of the original reporting at the time of publication, but whether its continued circulation served any subsisting public interest. In the absence of such interest, the High Court held that an individual’s right to dignity and reputation under Article 21 may justifiably prevail over press freedom. Additionally, the balance of convenience lay in the Respondent’s favour because the injury to his reputation could not be adequately compensated by damages. This warrants proportionate remedial measures such as de-indexing or restricted access rather than wholesale suppression of journalistic expression.

Do Corrections Cure Reputational Harm?

A central defence advanced by IE Online was that several of the impugned articles had been subsequently updated to record the Respondent’s discharge from the criminal proceedings, thereby sufficiently addressing any reputational concerns. The High Court, however, was not persuaded that such post-facto updates were adequate to remedy the continuing harm. The High Court observed that the reputational impact of digital news reporting is shaped not merely by the accuracy of the information contained within an article, but by the overall manner in which the content is disseminated.

In particular, headlines, URLs, metadata and search engine indexing play a determinative role in how information is encountered and interpreted by readers. Where the dominant narrative of an article continues to foreground allegations of criminality, a brief clarification appended at a later stage may do very little to alter the public perception originally created. As a result, the association between the individual and the alleged offence may continue to persist, notwithstanding formal corrections or disclaimers. The mere act of updating an article, without addressing its digital footprint, was therefore held to be insufficient to safeguard an individual’s right to dignity and reputation under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

This decision carries significant implications for digital publishers, media houses and online intermediaries operating within an increasingly permanent information ecosystem. It signals a judicial expectation that news reporting cannot remain static and requires continuous reassessment, particularly in cases of criminal proceedings reporting. Post-publication updates or clarifications, in isolation, may be inadequate where the dominant framing of content continues to associate an individual with criminal allegations.

Furthermore, a need arises for case-specific constitutional balancing between public interest and individual rights, particularly in light of the evolving contours of the right to be forgotten under Article 21. More broadly, the decision affirms that freedom of the press does not operate as a shield against constitutional scrutiny in the digital age.

[1]               2025 SCC OnLine Del 9281.

[2]               (2017) 10 SCC 1.

[3]               2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494.

LEAVE A REPLY